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ABSTRACT
The aim of this study was to investigate two aspects of accounting information that may be inherently related: income smoothing practices and 
conditional conservatism. Theoretically, the more a firm employs income smoothing, i.e., uses accruals to reduce the variability of profits, the less 
possibility there is for the timely acknowledgement of future economic losses (i.e., bad economic news) in profits. Eckel’s model (1981) was used 
in this study to classify listed companies as smoothing or non-smoothing, and Basu’s model (1997) was used to quantify the degree of conditional 
conservatism present in each firm. To make the results more robust, samples were created with annual stock return data from both March and 
December. The results indicated that non-smoothing firms had a higher degree of conditional conservatism, i.e., more opportunity to recognize 
future economic losses because the market could use the stock return data to anticipate future losses contained in the information regarding profits. 
This research made it possible to observe theoretical relationships between properties of accounting information: i) there is a relationship between 
income smoothing and conditional conservatism (i.e., accounting choices); ii) the informational environment of the Brazilian capital market 
contributes to the market distinction between smoothing and non-smoothing firms; and iii) the improvement of the capital market provides 
economic operators with greater insight into economic losses that are contained in accounting results.
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 1  IntrOductIOn
To date, the quality of accounting information cannot be 
measured by a single variable. When considering the various 
properties of the accounting information, we can highlight 
those that are the most researched: relevance, timeliness, 
conservatism, and earnings management (Lopes & Walker, 
2008; Barth, Landsman, & Lang, 2008).
In recent literature, several researchers using the ac-
counting information of listed companies in Brazil sou-
ght to investigate these properties either individually or 
jointly. For instance, Lopes and Walker (2008) analyzed 
how the development of the financial market, the mo-
del of governance, and the legal structure of a country 
can influence the quality of financial statements. Sarlo 
Neto (2008) verified that ownership structure influences 
the informativeness of the accounting earnings that are 
disclosed by companies trading on the BM&FBovespa 
(Bolsa de Valores, Mercadorias & Futuros de São Paulo). 
Pimentel (2009) investigated the earnings response coe-
fficient and found that there is a long-term relationship 
between profits and stock prices, that economic variables 
influence this relationship, and, in the short term, that 
the response coefficient is weak. In addition, Almeida 
(2010) found that the quality of accounting information 
that uses the metrics of relevance, timeliness, conser-
vatism, and earnings management varies depending on 
the degree of competition in the environment in which 
firms operate.
Although two properties of accounting informa-
tion have been identified, namely, income smoothing 
practices (which is an income management metric) and 
conditional conservatism, there are few studies that 
have evaluated the relationship between them. Gassen, 
Fülbier, & Sellhorn (2006) conducted an international 
analysis on the relationship between conservatism and 
income smoothing that considered institutional di-
fferences in code law and common law jurisdictions. 
Assets, Monahan, & Steele (2008) conducted a similar 
analysis that considered the number of business units 
in firms.
The conceptual approach of the present study is in ac-
cordance with Gassen et al. (2006) and Bens et al. (2008), 
who contend that income smoothing interferes with the 
accounting accruals of firms by reducing the ability of 
accounting to reflect the economic reality of a business 
and by increasing informational asymmetry in the capital 
market. These authors found that income smoothing also 
interferes with the perception of agents with regard to 
economic losses, which should vary based on the degree 
of conservatism.
Additionally, the interference of executives who 
smooth the incomes of their firms to reduce the varia-
bility of the firms’ profits can reduce the ability of sto-
ck returns to capture future economic losses included 
in profits or can conceal the extent of the firm's risk, 
as measured by variance in the accounting results over 
time (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeny, 1995). Several studies, 
such as those conducted by Coelho and Lima (2007, 
2009) and Barth, Landsman, & Lang (2008), suggest that 
these properties may be directly related and that one can 
affect the other.
According to Castro (2008, p. 7), income smoothing 
is practiced in accounting to reduce the variability of 
the accounting results. However, executive discretion 
is not used only in earnings management. For Coelho 
and Lima (2009), the discretionary power of executives 
is also reflected in the degree of conservatism of firms. 
In essence, firms can be more or less conservative in 
their accounting policies, and that degree of conserva-
tism affects their accounting results. Therefore, it is im-
portant to understand how the two practices described 
above can affect the quality of accounting information, 
as well as how the practice of smoothing results can in-
fluence conditional conservatism.
Lopes (2001, p. 93) explains that conservative compa-
nies do not disclose optimistic statements. In not disclo-
sing optimistic statements, the company reduces its current 
profits. However, a reduction of optimism in financial sta-
tements can also result from income smoothing practices. 
Excessive interference in reporting financial results decei-
ves shareholders by misrepresenting the economic realities 
of the business and may even prevent increases in profits 
(Almeida, 2006).
In the Brazilian scenario, conservatism is not practiced 
by a portion of company managers, which may suggest that 
these companies are managing (i.e., manipulating) their re-
sults (Coelho & Lima, 2007, p. 38).
In light of these practices, the present study seeks to 
investigate the following question: How do income smoo-
thing practices affect conditional conservatism in listed 
companies in Brazil?
The present research is unique because it investiga-
tes the possible interference of income smoothing prac-
tices on conditional conservatism in Brazilian compa-
nies. The relevance of the present study lies in the fact 
that the quality of accounting information depends on 
its qualitative characteristics and on how those who 
elaborate financial statements exert judgment on each 
of its properties.
In this introduction, the general approach to the pre-
sent study was summarized, delineating the motivation, 
objectives, and research problem. Section two explains 
the theoretical foundations for this study, describing the 
context for the study, key concepts, prior studies rela-
ted to conditional conservatism and income smoothing, 
and the study hypothesis. Section three discusses the 
methodological procedures, sample, and metrics and re-
gression models used in the study. Section four presents 
and discusses the results. Section five brings the final 
considerations together with ideas and suggestions for 
further research.
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 2  thEOrEtIcAl FOundAtIOnS
 2.1  Accounting information: conservatism and 
earnings management
Accounting information is continually influenced by 
risks, uncertainties, and, above all, economic factors (Ko-
thari, 2001). Lopes and Martins (2005, p. 66) argue that 
conservatism can "impair the measurement of economic 
reality by imposing the smallest value between two availa-
ble alternatives." Financial adjustments that depreciate as-
sets are most often reflected in firms’ accounting results, 
for example, via provisions for loan losses, adjustments to 
asset depreciation rates, or losses raised by impairment 
tests. These accounting choices are subjective and are 
directly related to the degree of discretion of those who 
draft the financial statements.
Scott (2009, p. 419) considers two aspects of con-
servative accounting: contractual performance and 
executive compensation. On the one hand, excessive 
conservatism can reduce the effectiveness of contracts 
because even with great effort on the part of the execu-
tives, profits and pay will be lower. On the other hand, 
this degree of conservatism increases the efficiency of 
contracts by reducing the need to manipulate earnings 
to increase them because, for rational investors, lower 
but constant profits can be more enticing. Thus, redu-
cing the ability of earnings management to expropria-
te shareholders, investors, and creditors only benefits 
executives.
Castro (2008) shows that it is interesting for managers 
to reduce the uncertainties or “risk measures” that are seen 
by investors concerning the economic and financial situa-
tion of the entities they manage. One type of uncertainty 
or "risk measure" is the variation or dispersion of earnings 
over time, which can be reduced via smoothing techniques 
that aim, within statutory accounting standards, to decre-
ase the dispersion of the accounting results, i.e., their va-
riability.
Other evidence in Brazil indicates that the practice 
of income smoothing has a direct relationship to the 
capital structure of Brazilian firms (Martinez & Castro, 
2009a), lowers the cost of third-party capital and long-
term debt structuring, and leads to the best ratings 
possible issued by risk agencies for the public issuance 
of debentures (Martinez & Castro, 2009b). Companies 
whose results have been analyzed by a greater number 
of analysts have a reduced rate of earnings manage-
ment, as measured by discretionary accruals (Marti-
nez, 2011).
 2.2 conservatism
As has already been briefly discussed, one characteristic 
of accounting information is conservatism. The definition 
used by Basu (1997, p. 7) is as follows:
I interpret conservatism as capturing accountants' ten-
dency to require a higher degree of verification for recog-
nizing good news than bad news in financial statements. 
[…] conservatism results in a greater probability of timely 
accounting recognition of bad news than good news.
In research studies, conservatism has been analyzed 
from two perspectives: conditional and unconditional. Co-
elho (2007, p. 136) conceptualizes the two forms of conser-
vatism as follows:
a)  Unconditional; arising from the rule that between 
two alternatives of measurement and recognition of 
events, equally valid, you should choose the one that 
results in the lowest assessment of proprietors’ assets; 
its purpose is that of prudence and is related to the de-
gree of uncertainty about the derivative effects of tran-
sactions initiated;
(b)  Conditional; referring to the possibility of antici-
pating the accounting recognition of economic losses 
– that is, not yet carried out – regarding the estimates 
performed by management based on current events of a 
negative slant; it is worth noting that this form is equi-
valent to recognizing economic facts in accounting with 
timeliness and with asymmetry, privileging evidence of 
negative results.
Scott (2009, p. 96) explains that conditional conser-
vatism is considered ex post, i.e., the write-downs are ad-
justed to construe a loss in the market value of the shares 
as an event occurs. Unconditional conservatism occurs ex 
ante, i.e., assets are valued below their current value on 
an ongoing basis, which will not affect the market value 
of the shares. One can then infer that unconditional con-
servatism interferes with the ability of economic agents in 
the capital market to distinguish an economic loss during 
a given period from the occurrence of continuous losses 
or from the undervaluation of assets. This condition is di-
rectly related to the anticipation or deferral of revenues 
and expenditures.
In the present study, conservatism will be analyzed 
in its conditional form by applying Basu’s model (1997), 
which will be presented in the methodology section. Ac-
cording to Ryan (2006), Basu’s study (1997) was the most 
influential study on the topic in the past decade and con-
sequently is the most widely used model.
 2.3  Income smoothing
Another characteristic of accounting information 
that has been studied is income smoothing. Martinez 
(2001, p. 43) notes that there are three types of earnin-
gs management, including the practice of reducing va-
riability in accounting results, i.e., income smoothing. 
The term “earnings management” is broader than this 
practice alone, as it involves a number of different ma-
nipulation techniques, aside from smoothing, which 
are used to reduce variability in results or to make it 
grow gradually.
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 Figure 1  Income smoothing processes
Source: adapted from Eckel (1981, p. 29)
Michelson, Jordan-Wagner, & Wootton (1988, p. 
323) define income smoothing in the following way: 
"Managers of accounting selectively reduce fluctuations 
that arise in profits during accounting exercises accor-
ding to a framework of generally accepted accounting 
principles."
There are several metrics that can verify the presence 
of income smoothing. Among these metrics are Eckel’s 
model (1981) and a metric developed by Leuz, Nanda, & 
Wysocki (2003). The income smoothing metric develo-
ped by Leuz et al. (2003) uses the standard deviation of 
the operating profit divided by the standard deviation of 
the operating cash flow to generate a new variable that 
aggregates all of the observations of a firm over the years. 
For the purposes of the present study, this metric would 
inhibit the application of Basu’s model (1997) because it 
aggregates the standard deviations of observations and 
would not catch the possibility of income smoothing by 
a firm in one period and not in another, which would 
lead to other methodological issues, such as how to sti-
pulate the mean or median cut-point for separating fir-
ms into smoothers and non-smoothers.
Therefore, in the present study, Eckel’s model (1981) 
has been chosen, enabling this study to divide the sample 
objectively into two groups of firms: smoothing and non-
smoothing.
Eckel’s (1981, p. 29) flowchart showing smoothing prac-
tices is shown in Figure 1.
Artificial smoothing Real smoothing
Intentional smoothing
by managers
Natural smoothing
(of accounting processes)
Flowchart of income
smoothing practices
Smoothing may occur through the accounting proces-
ses of recognition, measurement, and disclosure, as well 
as intentionally. Artificial smoothing implies the use of 
accruals, which does not affect cash flow and is not based 
on economic events; rather, it is similar to a postpone-
ment or anticipation of revenues and expenditures. Con-
versely, real smoothing involves economic events, such as 
the sale or purchase of fixed assets, which also affect cash 
flow. However, in both cases, executives act intentionally 
to smooth results.
 2.4  the relationship between conservatism and 
income smoothing and the development of 
our hypothesis
In general, both conditional conservatism and income 
smoothing are properties of accounting information that 
are directly related to and influence the quality of the ac-
counting information that is disclosed to the market.
The reduction of optimism in the results disclosed is 
theoretically a feature of accounting conservatism; howe-
ver, in this case, reduced optimism can also be a conse-
quence of income smoothing practices that are intended to 
prevent profits from appearing to be too far above or below 
market expectations. Therefore, both of these practices, 
conservatism and smoothing, can result in a reduction of 
optimism.
Gassen et al. (2006) analyzed how conservatism is affec-
ted by the practices of income smoothing in code law and 
common law countries by considering 23 jurisdictions 
using Basu’s model (1997) with Fame-Mac Beth regression 
coefficients. The results support the theoretical claim that 
smoothing interferes with a firm’s capacity to recognize bad 
economic news (i.e., economic losses).
The abovementioned authors argue that conditional 
conservatism is positively associated with the degree of 
indebtedness of firms, as income smoothing affects firms’ 
dividend policies. The legal system also has an effect on the 
degree of conservatism and optimism reflected in financial 
statements in that the code law system reduces the explana-
tory power of conditional conservatism.
In a study related to the relationship between inco-
me smoothing and conditional conservatism, Bens et al. 
(2008) analyzed the characteristics of firms, specifically the 
diversification (i.e., segmentation) of business units, which 
affects this dichotomy. Considering that diversification and 
transactions between firms reduce the accounting system's 
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ability to communicate bad economic news in a timely 
manner, Bens et al. empirically established that accounting 
discretion is used by business units to reduce the variation 
in profits among the units until a consolidated result is ob-
tained that is released to the market and that does not re-
flect economic losses.
Thus, considering that smoothing practices have an 
effect on a firm’s level of conditional conservatism and in-
crease informational asymmetry in the capital market, the 
following research hypotheses were developed:
H1: Non-smoothing listed companies acknowledge 
economic losses in a timelier manner than do companies 
that participate in smoothing.
This hypothesis was motivated by the gap in the litera-
ture concerning the effects of accounting choices on con-
ditional conservatism and income smoothing. Another 
motivation for this hypothesis was to ascertain whether 
elaborate theoretical models including different constructs 
can explain the phenomena highlighted in the present stu-
dy with empirical evidence.
 3  MEthOdS
A literature review was the starting point of the 
present study, which gave theoretical support to the 
relationship between conditional conservatism and 
income smoothing. The present study is of an empiri-
cal-analytical nature and consequently is quantitative 
in that phenomena are observed and conclusions are 
inferred from the results obtained through the applica-
tion of econometric models to secondary data (Martins 
& Theóphilo, 2007, p. 37). This study is based on a po-
sitive approach toward accounting phenomena (Watts 
& Zimmerman, 1986, p. 1), as it begins with theoretical 
arguments to support conclusions regarding the topic 
studied.
 3.1  Sample selection, data collection, and data 
analysis
The sample set studied was composed of listed com-
panies with shares that are traded on the São Paulo 
stock market (BM&FBovespa). All data, namely, total 
assets, total revenues, net income, the closing value of 
shares in December and March from 1997 to 2009, net 
profits, and net losses, were obtained using Economa-
tica® software.
To strengthen the results and give consistency to the 
theoretical constructs in the models, two sample sets 
were derived. One sample set included data from March 
after the publication of the financial statements (throu-
gh Economatica® software analysis, it was found that the 
studied companies released results until March and that 
it was not necessary to use data from April). The other 
sample set included data from December to check whe-
ther there would be any changes in the results and whe-
ther the market had already provided that information 
in advance.
To analyze the object of study (i.e., to compare the de-
gree of conservatism among the groups of listed compa-
nies that either smooth or do not smooth results), Eckel’s 
model (1981) was applied, which will be explained in sec-
tion 3.2.1.
Subsequently, from the original data (8,352 observa-
tions), the observations needed (net income and sales 
revenue) to classify the companies into smoothers and 
non-smoothers were extracted, reducing the sample 
set to 4,044 observations. Next, variables with extreme 
values based on Eckel’s model were excluded, leaving 
a total of 3,978 observations in the sample set (March 
and December).
The next step was to classify companies into smoothers 
and non-smoothers, to normalize the variables in Basu’s 
model (1997), and to exclude observations greater than 
three standard deviations from the mean. After the classi-
fication, there were 476 companies in the smoothers group 
and 388 in the non-smoothers group in the December 
sample set, and there were 650 companies in the smoothers 
group and 566 companies in the non-smoothers group in 
the March sample set.
The procedures adopted to process the samples follo-
wed the suggestions of Fávero, Belfiore, Silva & Chan 
(2009, p. 56) and Martins (2002, p. 59), who indicated 
that the outliers (i.e., the disparate observations in the 
sample) can either be directly excluded or can be repla-
ced using the Winsorization method on each side of the 
distribution or by standardizing the variables to exclude 
observations above three standard deviations from the 
mean. It is worth noting that the method applied depen-
ds on the interests and goals of the researcher. In the 
present study, the Winsorized variables are not suitable 
because they would affect our ability to observe the phe-
nomenon investigated by repeating the values of obser-
vations above or below a cut-off point in each tail, which 
would affect the measurement of income smoothing and 
conservatism. In any case, the treatment of data in ap-
plied social sciences studies is subjective and allows the 
researcher to choose the method that is least likely to 
alter the phenomenon investigated.
It was also necessary to exclude observations that 
could not be classified as income smoothing or non-
smoothing because they had coefficient of variation 
values, which are discussed in section 3.2.1, that fell 
within a band called a gray area. This procedure was 
adopted according to the studies of Iñiguez and Pove-
da (2004), Castro (2008, p. 76), Martinez and Castro 
(2009a, 2011), and Valipour, Talebnia and Javanmard 
(2011).
Table 1 summarizes the data processing procedure.
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 Table 1  Data processing 
Initial observations – 696 firms per year 8.352
(-) Observations with errors or incomplete observations based on Eckel’s model (4,308) (4.308)
(=) Number of observations without errors 4.044
(-) Processing the outliers – exclusion of the observations above or below three standard deviations from the mean (65)
(=) Sample after filtering data pertaining to Eckel’s model 3.978
Reference month Dezembro Março
(=) Subtotal of observations 3.978 3.978
(-) Variables with errors or null variables associated with profits and stock returns (3.061) (2.734)
(=) Total segregated sample 917 1.298
(-) Processing the outliers – exclusion of the observations above or below three standard deviations from the mean, 
based on Basu’s model (1997)
(36) (54)
(=) Subtotal of samples 881 1.244
(-) Exclusion of observations in Eckel’s grey area (17) (28)
(=) Final sample of income smoothing companies 476 650
(=) Final sample of non-smoothing companies 388 566
CVΔ%Net Profit
CVΔ%Sales
NIit Pit-1
ERit Pit-1
ERit Pit-1
 3.2  Models applied
Eckel’s model (1981) for the classification and se-
gregation of the sample into smoothing and non-
smoothing companies and Basu’s model (1997), which 
measures conditional conservatism, were the models 
applied in the present study, and their metrics are ex-
plained below.
3.2.1 Eckel’s model for measuring income smoothing
Eckel’s model (1981) is based on the premise that re-
venues and costs are linear over time. Therefore, they 
grow or decline at the same rate; when a linear rela-
tionship is not observed, this property may be due to 
interference from executives to smooth the results. In 
section 2.3, the justification for the use of this model 
despite the detriment incurred on the metric of Leuz et 
al. (2003) was summarized.
To observe the relationship between profits and re-
venues, the coefficients of the percentage variations of 
profits and sales revenue are used. When the coefficient 
of the profit is less than that of the revenue, this de-
monstrates that the company is interfering in the profits 
through artificial smoothing. The author's definition is 
as follows:
CVΔ%Net Profit ≤ CVΔ%Sales = Smoothing,
where
CVΔ%Net Profit = Net Profitt – Net Profitt-1 / Net Profitt-1.
CVΔ%Sales = Revenuet – Revenuet-1 / Revenuet-1.
From these data, income smoothing is estimated using 
Eckel's index formula (EI):
According to Iñiguez and Poveda (2004), Martinez and 
Castro (2009a), and Castro (2008, p. 76), an interval betwe-
en 0.9 and 1.1 is considered a gray area in which it is not 
possible to sort firms into smoothers or non-smoothers. 
This procedure allows for the objective classification of 
firms, thus reducing risk of bias from the researcher. The 
observations falling within that range were excluded, as de-
monstrated by the processing of the sample shown in Table 
1. The following formula defines the gray area:
0,9<                                         <1,1
This shows that if the index obtained is less than 0.9, 
the company performs income smoothing, and if the index 
is greater than 1.1, the company does not perform income 
smoothing.
3.2.2 Basu’s model for estimating conditional 
conservatism
Basu’s model (1997) is a metric that facilitates the 
analysis of conditional conservatism, as explained in 
the section describing the theoretical basis for this 
work. Basu’s model is based on the premise that, upon 
recognition of a future economic loss in profit of a gi-
ven entity, the market recognizes that loss in stock re-
turns in a timely manner.
Basu’s model is represented by the following regression: 
              = βo+ β1Dit+β2                               + β3Dit*               + εit 
where
 NIit = The net income per share of company i in the 
year t, corrected by unfoldings;
Dit = A dummy variable, which is one if the economic 
return is negative and zero if it is positive for firm i in year 
t;
ERit = The economic return per share of company i in 
year t (Pit – Pit–1/ Pit–1, adjusted by the payment of divi-
dends and unfoldings);
Pit–1 = The share price of company i at the end of year 
t-1, adjusted for unfoldings and dividends;
β2 = This captures the accounting profit opportunity ba-
sed on the economic returns of the accounting profits;
β1 and β3 = These reflect the accounting profit oppor-
CVΔ%Net Profit
CVΔ%SalesEI=
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 Table 2  Descriptive statistics for sample data from March
Panel A: General sample
Variables Obs. Mean SD Min. Max.
EI 1.244 790,63 26960,4 -24854,4 948174
NI 1.244 0,099 0,398 -2,451 2,509
ER 1.244 0,460 1,035 -0,947 13,362
D 1.244 0,349 0,477 0 1
D*ER 1.244 -0,119 0,214 -0,947 1
Panel B: Sample of listed smoothing companies
EIs 650 -98,522 1284,665 -24854,42 0,897
NIs 650 0,082 0,393 -2,451 2,509
ERs 650 0,420 0,971 -0,904 7.660
Ds 650 0,377 0,485 0 1
D*ERs 650 -0,132 0,222 -0,904 0
Panel C: Sample of listed non-smoothing companies
EIns 566 1850,806 39939,16 1,103 948174
NIns 566 0,123 0,399 -2,06 1,936
ERns 566 0,505 1,114 -0,947 13,362
Dns 566 0,322 0,467 0 1
D*ERns 566 -0,104 0,202 -0,947 0
Note: EI = Eckel’s index; NIit= net income per share of company i in year t, corrected by unfolding; Dit = dummy variable, which is one if the economic 
return is negative and zero if it is positive, for firm i in year t; ERit = economic return per share of company i in year t (Pit – Pit–1/ Pit–1, adjusted by the pay-
ment of dividends and unfoldings). The letters "s" and "ns" represent variables in the samples of smoothing and non-smoothing firms, respectively. 
 Table 3  Descriptive statistics for sample data from December
Panel A: General sample
Variables Obs. Mean SD Min. Max.
EI 881 2,026438 244,7953 -3897 4888
NI 881 0,105 0,5069909 -2,642 2,392
ER 881 0,536 1,216656 -0,977 11,954
D 881 0,382 0,4862785 0 1
D*ER 881 -0,163 0,2584022 -0,977 0
continues
tunity, i.e., the recognition of economic returns from the 
accounting profits;
εit = White’s robust error regression coefficient.
According to the theoretical foundations of the present 
study, it is expected that the β3 coefficient will be positive for 
the companies that do not smooth their results; that is, for this 
group, it is expected that the opportunity to recognize future 
economic losses in the disclosed profits will be greater.
If the β3 coefficient is not statistically significant and 
positive for the group that does not smooth results, or if the 
inverse is found, this result would show that there is a gre-
ater opportunity to recognize bad economic news for com-
panies that smooth results, and the theoretical constructs 
and models used in this study would need to be revisited.
 4  AnAlySES OF thE rESultS
The analyses of the results were performed using descriptive 
statistics that reveal the behaviors and characteristics of the va-
riables, correlations between the variables, and regression analy-
ses by applying Basu’s conditional conservatism model (1997).
 4.1  descriptive statistics
Table 2 (panels A, B, and C) summarizes the descripti-
ve statistics for the March samples of smoothers and non-
smoothers.
The means and standard deviations of Eckel’s index were 
high, despite the data processing that was performed. For 
the purposes of the model application, these high values do 
not affect the analysis because Eckel’s index was only used 
to sort the firms into smoothers and non-smoothers. The 
means of the other variables did not show major dispari-
ties in any of the samples. The means of the variables were 
actually similar between samples; for example, the means 
for the variable NI, which is dependent on Basu’s model, 
are 0.099, 0.082, and 0.123 for the general sample, the in-
come smoothing sample, and the non-smoothing sample, 
respectively.
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the same 
samples based on the December data.
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Panel B: Sample of listed smoothing companies
Variables Obs. Mean SD Min. Max.
EIs 476 -30,48 202,95 -3897 0,885
NIs 476 0,048 0,523  -2,642 2,086
ERs 476 0,523 1,20 -0,930 9
Ds 476 0,384 0,487 0 1
D*ERs 476 -0,170 0,263 -0,930 0
Panel C: Sample of listed non-smoothing companies
EIns 388 41,95 287,76 1,103 4888
NIns 388 0,180 0,474 -2,059 2,392
ERns 388 0,555 1,241 -0,977 11,954
Dns 388 0,379 0,486 0 1
D*ERns 388 -0,154 0,249 -0,977 0
Note: EI = Eckel’s index; NIit = net income per share of company i in year t, corrected by unfolding; Dit = dummy variable, which is one if the econo-
mic return is negative and zero if it is positive, for firm i in year t; ERit = economic return per share of company i in year t (Pit – Pit–1/ Pit–1, adjusted by the 
payment of dividends and unfoldings). The letters "s" and "ns" represent variables in the samples of smoothing and non-smoothing firms, respectively.
Table 3 continued
 Table 4  Correlations among variables in the 
conservatism model
Panel A: Correlations for March data
Variables NI ER D D*ER
NI 1
ER 0,138*** 1
D -0,168*** - 1
-0,566***
D*ER 0,193*** 0,518*** - 1
-0,760***
Panel B: Correlations for December data
Variables NI ER D D*ER
NI 1
ER 0,224*** 1
D -0,210*** - 1
-0,624***
D*ER 0,225*** 0,576*** -0,804*** 1
***, **,* = significant at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. NI = the earnings per 
share by set by price in year t-1; ER = the return on shares; D = a dummy 
variable equaling one for negative returns and 0 otherwise; D*ER = the 
interaction between D and ER. 
 Table 5  Results of regression analyses
                = β0 + β1Dit + β2                 + β3Dit*                            + εit
Independent Variables March Sample December Sample
β3 D*ER
0,270 *** 0,257 ***
(0,774) (0,109)
[3,50] [2,35]
β2 ER
0,0169 0,056
(0,040) (0,048)
[0,42] [1,18]
β1 D
-0,0276 - 0,02
(0,449) (0,072)
[-0,61] [-0,28]
β0
0,133 *** 0,125 ***
(0,0348) (0,05)
[3,83] [2,40]
No. Obs. 1.244 881
R² -Adjust. 0,0397 0,0642
Prob - F 0,000 0,000
Note: coefficients are shown in the first row, standard errors are shown inside 
parentheses in the second row, and t-statistics are shown in brackets in the 
third row. ***,**,* = significant at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. ER = the 
economic return of firm i in period t; D = a dummy variable equaling one for 
negative returns and 0 otherwise; ER*D = the interaction between ER and D. 
NIit Pit-1
ERit Pit-1
ERit Pit-1
Table 3 shows in panels A, B, and C that the mean of 
NI fluctuates between 0.105, 0.048, and 0.18, respectively. 
It is worth noting that the standard deviation of NI is lower 
among non-smoothing companies (0.474). There were no 
relevant differences for the other variables. The mean va-
lue of the economic return (ER) variable was notably close 
among the samples.
 4.2  correlations among the variables
The correlation between variables shows the degree of 
association among them, which can alert us to any possi-
ble problems in the estimators used to conduct regressions. 
Table 4 shows the correlations of Basu’s model variables 
(1997) for March (Panel A) and December (Panel B).
It is worth noting that the variables from the Decem-
ber data (Panel B) are more strongly inter-correlated than 
are the same variables from the March data (Panel A). In 
addition, the correlation between NI and ER in March was 
0.138, whereas the correlation was 0.224 in December, whi-
ch may suggest that there are greater expectations concer-
ning the information contained in profits and prices publi-
shed in December, i.e., prior to any disclosure of financial 
statements.
 4.3  regression analysis
The results of the regression analyses are shown in sta-
ges, and each table displays the results for the March and 
December samples to provide more robust evidence. First, 
Table 5 shows the results for the overall sample before it was 
partitioned into smoothing and non-smoothing firms.
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 Table 6  Results of regression analyses for listed 
smoothing companies
                = β0 + β1Dit + β2                 + β3Dit*                            + εit
Independent Variables March Sample December Sample
β3 D*ER
0,125 0,094
(0,083) (0,152)
[1,50] [0,62]
β2 ER
0,058 0,112 ***
(0,025) (0,041)
[2,26] [2,72]
β1 D
- 0,016 0,006
(0,049) (0,087)
[-0,34] [0,07]
β0
0,080 *** 0,003
(0,0236) (0,047)
[3,41] [0,07]
No. Obs. 650 476
R² -Adjust. 0,0439 0,0813
Prob - F 0,000 0,000
Note: coefficients are shown in the first row, standard errors are shown 
inside parentheses in the second row, and t-statistics are shown in brackets 
in the third row. ***,**,* = significant at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. ER = 
the economic return of firm i in period t; D = a dummy variable equaling 
one for negative returns and 0 otherwise; ER*D = the interaction between 
ER and D.
NIit Pit-1
ERit Pit-1
ERit Pit-1
 Table 7  Results of regression analyses for listed non-
smoothing companies
                = β0 + β1Dit + β2                 + β3Dit*                            + εit
Independent Variables March Sample December Sample
β3 D*ER
0,442*** 0,481***
(0,131) (0,138)
[3,36] [3,48]
β2 ER
-0,018 - 0,003
(0,061) (0,077)
[-0,30] [-0,04]
β1 D
-0,031 - 0,022
(0,064) (0,100)
[-0,48] [-0,22]
β0
0,188 *** 0,264 ***
(0,052) (0,083)
[3,56] [3,16]
No. Obs. 566 388
R² -Adjust. 0,0537 0,0712
Prob - F 0,000 0,000
Note: coefficients are shown in the first row, standard errors are shown 
inside parentheses in the second row, and t-statistics are shown in brackets 
in the third row. ***,**,* = significant at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. ER = 
the economic return of firm i in period t; D = a dummy variable equaling 
one for negative returns and 0 otherwise; ER*D = the interaction between 
ER and D.
NIit Pit-1
ERit Pit-1
ERit Pit-1
This initial evidence can confirm whether the model for 
the total sample conforms to what is predicted by the the-
ory. The β3 coefficient of the variable D*ER, displayed in 
Table 5, is positive and significant for both March and De-
cember data (0.270 and 0.257, respectively), as well as for 
the total sample, as expected by the theory. In other words, 
firms are generally conservative, i.e., they acknowledge bad 
economic news in a timely manner and incorporate it into 
reports of profits, and the market identifies this informa-
tion in the stock returns.
Table 6 displays the results for the sample of companies 
that smooth results.
As observed in Table 6, only the positive economic re-
turns (i.e., the good news) of the coefficient β2 for the ER 
variable were significant for the December data (0.112). 
According to the theory behind the present study, firms 
that smooth results eventually interfere with the results 
they disclosed by, for example, provisioning more or adjus-
ting depreciation, amortization, or other accruals that ul-
timately distort the economic realities of the business; this 
makes it difficult for the market to recognize anticipated 
economic losses in profits. This is probably a consequence 
of unconditional conservatism, i.e., of continuously un-
derstated assets.
Table 7 shows the regression results for the non-smoo-
thing firms according to Eckel’s model.
According to the theory behind this study, it is expec-
ted that when firms do not smooth their results, i.e., when 
there is less interference in the linearization of profits, fu-
ture economic losses can most expediently be recognized 
by the market. As the results that are disclosed by these 
non-smoothing firms do not suffer as much interference 
(or suffer less interference from accounting choices) at the 
discretion of those who elaborate the accounting informa-
tion, it was possible to observe conditional conservatism as 
represented by the β3 D*ER variable.
Analysis of the variable β3 D*ER, which is the interac-
tion between the dummy for negative returns and the eco-
nomic return, verified that the coefficients for this variable 
are positive and are statistically significant for both March 
(0.442) and December (0.481). This indicates that the re-
porting of the profits of non-smoothing firms is of a higher 
quality, which facilitates the market’s recognition of econo-
mic losses (bad economic news).
In addition, we found that the classification of listed 
companies into groups of smoothers and non-smoothers 
based on Eckel’s (1981) model justified the application of 
Basu’s (1997) conditional conservatism model.
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